The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?
Throughout most of the United States, local governments regulate
the use of privately owned land.' Local land use regulations are usually
embodied in zoning and subdivision ordinances and in building and
housing codes. These regulations often require large lots or large houses;
prohibit row housing, apartment buildings, or factory-built housing;
and restrict the number of bedrooms or persons allowed in a housing
unit.
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1 A recent survey indicated that approximately fourteen thousand local governments
(out of approximately eighteen thousand in the sample survey) employ some form of land
use regulation.

NATIONAL COMMI'N ON URBAN

PROBLEMS,

BUILDING

THE AMERICAN

CITY

208-09 (1968). A number of states differ from the national pattern by reserving the exercise of certain regulatory powers to state agencies. See, e.g., HAWAnI REv. STAT. § 205
(1968); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-28 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6001-091 (Supp. 1971); Wise. STAT. ANN. § 144.26 (Supp. 1972). See generally COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE QuIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). The
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE arts. 7, 8 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971) provides for state
control of certain land use decisions now usually made by local governments. Florida has
adopted the Code, and other state legislatures are considering adoption. State agencies are
more likely to consider the extraterritorial effects of local land use regulations and are
therefore less likely than local agencies to impose excessive burdens on residence in local
communities. For a comprehensive description of land use regulation in the United States,
see Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. REv. 367
(1965).
2 See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H.
1972) (rezoning from a minimum lot size of thirty-five thousand square feet to three and
six acres); Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (no more
than four unrelated individuals per housing unit in a single-family district); Malmar
Associates v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971) (limited number
of three- and four-bedroom apartments); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d
460 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 US. 851 (1971) (exclusion of mobile homes from residential
areas); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 NJ. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 319 (1953) (minimum floor space of 768 square feet). See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLE S, supra note 1, at 199-321. The actual effect
of any land use regulation depends on supply and demand conditions in a particular area.
See, e.g., Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Distribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Note,
Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969). For a descriptive assessment of the pattern
and aggregate effect of local land use regulations in the New York City metropolitan area,
see R. ANDERSON, RESIDENTIAL ANALYSIS FOR W srcnEsrm COUNTY, NEw YORK: ZONING
ORDINANCES AND ADMINISTRATION (1970); NATIONAL Comm. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN
HOUSING, JOBS AND HOUSING (Interim. Report 1970); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary
Ldnd Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 475
(1971).

Right to Travel and Land Use Regulations

The manner in which some local governments have exercised their
power to regulate land uses has often been criticized.3 These localities
are said to have misallocated the nation's scarce resources by employing
land use regulations to benefit their own residents at the expense of
other citizens. In particular, they are accused of retarding the growth of
their populations or of creating tax and service havens for their own
residents by excluding higher-density or lower-cost housing. In addition,
some land use regulations are thought to be means by which members
of minority groups are excluded from better living conditions, better
jobs, or better schooling for their children.
This rising tide of criticism has prompted commentators to reevaluate
the constitutionality of local land use regulations. This comment reviews the traditional federal constitutional challenges based on unjustified deprivation of property or racial discrimination and concludes that
the Supreme Court is not likely to invalidate most local land use regulations on either basis. The comment then considers recently articulated
challenges based on discrimination against the poor and denial of the
right to housing or to the necessities of life and concludes that the Court
is not likely to invalidate any local land use regulations on these
grounds. The body of the comment examines the possible consequences
for local land use regulations of the constitutional right to travel from
state to state. Although courts have not yet discussed whether this right
is a sufficient basis for invalidating local land use regulations, the right
to travel may become the most significant federal constitutional standard for public regulations that prevent additional persons from residing in local communities. 4
I.

TRDITIONAL CONSTrrUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR LOCAL LAND USE
REGULATIONS

A.

Deprivation of Property
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides that no state

3 See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, Tim ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1966);
S. TOLL, ZONED AmEruCA (1969); Aloi, Goldberg, & White, Racial and Economic Segregation
by Zoning: Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1 U. ToLEDo L. RFv. 65 (1969); Feller, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-Towarda Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. Rrv.
655 (1971); Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1971); Comment,
The General Welfare, Welfare Economics, and Zoning Variances, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 548
(1965); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970); authorities
cited note 35 infra.
4 See Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws,
66 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 635 (1971); Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protection,and Application Under the Constitution, 40 U. MIssOu~i-KANsAs Crry L. REV. 66 (1971). For a discussion of James v. Valtierra, 402 US. 137 (1971), as a right-to-travel case, see note 59 infra.
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shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 5 This constitutional standard applies to local governments
as well as to the states. 6 In interpreting this provision, the Supreme
Court has distinguished public "takings" of private property, which require just compensation, from justified public regulation of the uses of
private property.7 If a private use is harmful to the public, a state or its
local governments may forbid or condition the use to protect the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.8 To challenge such use regulations successfully, the owner of land is required to prove that regulation
bears no reasonable relation to a constitutionally permissible governmental interest.9
The difficulty of sustaining such a burden of persuasion is illustrated
by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.10 The trial court found that
the Village of Euclid's comprehensive zoning ordinance had reduced the
value of the plaintiff's land by several hundred thousand dollars and
held that the ordinance, considered as a whole, did not sufficiently promote the public welfare to justify the significant harm it imposed on the
plaintiff." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was
not on its face "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substan2
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'
The Court's opinion is remarkable because it ignored the trial court's
finding that the true purpose of Euclid's ordinance, as judged by its
likely effect, was "to classify the population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life." 18 Although Euclid had implicitly discriminated on the basis of wealth, the Court found sufficient justification for the regulation in its plausible "rational relation to the health
and safety of the community."' 4 In Euclid and in three of the five subse5 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7 See generally Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in, Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. Rav. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HAPtv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALS L.J. 36 (1964);
Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
8 See generally E. FRauND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGIrrs (1904); Comment, supra note 3.
9 See cases cited note 2 supra; text and notes at notes 10-19 infra.
10 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11 Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
12 272 US. at 395. The Court reserved decision on the question whether particular
provisions of the ordinance as applied to the plaintiff's land were unconstitutional as unjustified deprivations of property.

297 F. at 316.
14 272 U.S. at 891.
13
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quent land use regulation cases that it heard on the merits, the Court
deferred almost entirely to the judgment of the local legislature.1 5
Although the Court has recently invalidated some state laws regulating private property, the Court's intervention appears to be limited
to guaranteeing fair judicial procedure. 16 Such a posture is consistent
with the Court's continued deference to the judgment of Congress and
state and local legislatures on questions involving the substance of governmental regulation of private property.'7 The Court will usually
find such legislation constitutional "if any set of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.' u The Court continues to place the burden
of persuasion on the challenger of the regulation, who must prove that
the legislation in question is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. 19
Given the difficulty of establishing unreasonableness under the present
federal standard, most local land use regulations will not be invalidated
20
as unjustified deprivations of property.
15 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Washington ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S.
325 (1927); cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Washington and Nectow the Court
held the regulations in question unconstitutional without establishing standards for judg-

ing subsequent land use regulation cases.
16 E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). But cf. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
92 S. Ct. 1113, 1118 (1972) (dictum): "'Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was re-

garded by the framers of [the Fourteenth] Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the
realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to
guarantee.'" Taken literally, this passage and others, e.g., id. at 1122, suggest that stricter

standards of judicial review may be applied to the substance of governmental regulations.
Other recent cases, however, seem to preclude such an interpretation. See, e.g., Richardson
v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); James v. valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also authorities cited note 17 infra. Although in Lindsey the Court

relied on the equal protection clause to invalidate the double-bond and double-penalty provisions of Oregon's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, the same result could have been

reached by interpreting the due process clause. For most purposes the two clauses appear to
be equivalent. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See text and notes at notes
41-49, 123-24 inlra.
17 For detailed discussions and criticism of the Court's "deference," see Schrock, The
Liberal Court, the Conservative Court, and Constitutional Jurisprudence, in LErr, Rorr
AND CENTER: EssAYs ON LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATS
IN THE UNITED STATES 87 (R. Goldwin ed. 1967); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34; Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle
and Economic Due Process,80 HARv. L. R v. 1463 (1967).
18 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
19 See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
20 A few state courts have adopted constitutional standards that require a higher level
of justification for certain local land use regulations. See, e.g., Leet v. Montgomery County,
264 Md. 606, 287 A.2d 491 (1972); Molino v. Mayor & Council, 116 NJ. Super. 195, 281 A.2d
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B.

Racial Discrimination
Regulations that discriminate on the basis of race are, in the Supreme
Court's words, "'constitutionally suspect' . . and subject to the 'most
rigid scrutiny.' ",21 To justify racial classifications, the state is required
to prove that they are "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which
it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate."' Unlike
the land use regulation cases discussed above,23 the Court will find
prima facie cases of racial discrimination unconstitutional unless the
state sustains a "very heavy burden of justification." 24 No state has ever
succeeded in carrying this burden of persuasion. 25
Some of the first local land use regulations were declared unconstitutional because they discriminated, either on their face 6 or as applied,
against a racially defined minority. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins27 the Court
reviewed a San Francisco ordinance regulating the use of buildings for
laundries. As a supposed fire prevention measure, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors required persons wishing to continue to operate
laundries in wooden buildings to obtain special permits. Such permits
were granted to approximately eighty non-Chinese applicants and
denied to one non-Chinese and all of approximately two hundred
Chinese applicants.&2 8 The Court held that since San Francisco had
offered no justification for such discrimination, "the conclusion cannot
be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and
nationality to which petitioners belong.

. . ... Although the local

401 (1971); Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970); Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959). Needless to say, different state constitutional standards for local land use regulation
are compatible with a permissive federal constitutional standard.
21 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964) (both quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), and Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
22 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
23 See text and notes at notes 2-19 supra.
24 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
25 The only recent case in which a government sustained its very heavy burden of persuasion is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which suggests that only the
equivalent of the "[p]ressing public necessity" of national survival in wartime would be
a sufficient justification. Id. at 216.
26 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (alternative holding).
27 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
28 San Francisco had approximately 320 laundries; about 240 were owned and operated
by Chinese and about 80 by non-Chinese. All but about 10 laundries were constructed of
wood. All of the Chinese were aliens.
29 118 U.S. at 374.
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ordinance was constitutional on its face, the Court viewed its application as sufficient evidence of the racial discrimination forbidden by the
fourteenth amendment.3 0
More recently, in Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lack1 the Court of Appeals
awannaP
for the Second Circuit found unconstitutional similar racial discrimination in the administration of local
land use regulations. The City of Lackawanna refused permission to a
proposed residential subdivision to tie into the city's sewer system on
the ground that its sewage disposal facilities were inadequate. After a
detailed review of the record, the court agreed with the district judge's
finding that the city had refused permission to prevent a proposed
federally subsidized housing project for lower-income and minority
families from being built in the city's almost all-white Third Ward.
Since the Third Ward provided better living conditions than the
racially integrated First Ward (where 98.9 percent of the city's nonwhites lived) the court agreed that the city's actions constituted unconstitutional discrimination against a racially defined minority. The
city's public health justification for its refusal to permit a tie-in to
the city sewage system was vitiated, in the court's judgment, by the
fact that other subdivisions in the Third Ward had been granted such
permission despite a long-standing inadequacy in the system.
Other lower courts have also found certain applications of local land
use regulations to constitute unjustified racial discrimination. In each
case the plaintiffs were able to make a prima facie showing of intentional racial discrimination by the local government. 32 It is doubtful,
however, that such a showing could be made with respect to the content or administration of most local land use regulations. Most local
systems of land use regulation appear to exclude additional residents
from the locality not on the basis of race, but on the basis of insufficient
financial resources. By limiting the supply of lower-cost housing, local
land use regulations appear to prevent lower-income persons and
families from settling in better residential areas.
It might be argued that discrimination against the poor is effectively
the same as discrimination against nonwhites. Although this opinion
is widely held, it is, as a general matter, false in fact. In absolute numbers more than twice as many whites as nonwhites are below the gov30 Cf. Alexander v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1221 (1972); Griffin v. Prince Edward County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 264 U.S. 339 (1960). But cf. Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
31 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
32 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp.
382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ernmentally defined poverty level. 33 Even assuming a wide margin for
error in these statistics, a court would not be justified to conclude without additional evidence that higher prices for housing in desirable
areas exclude solely or even primarily nonwhites. Although the traditional constitutional standard of racial discrimination is dearly relevant
to some local land use regulations, it does not appear to be the comprehensive judicial standard that critics of local controls are searching
for 34
II.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR LOCAL LAND
USE REGULATIONS

A. Discrimination Against the Poor
Many commentators appear to have recognized the insufficiency of
the racial discrimination standard and have shifted their attention to
the fact that many land use regulations appear to discriminate against
the poor by raising the costs of living in desirable areas.3 5 These highercost areas are desirable residential locations not only because of the
33 As defined by the Social Security Administration, the poverty level, in 1969 dollars,
ranged from $1,487 for a single female sixty-five years of age or older and living on a farm
to, for example, $6,116 for a seven-person family headed by a male and not living on a
farm. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIED STATES 821 (1971). In
1969 approximately 16.7 million whites and 7.6 million nonwhites were below the poverty
level. Id. at 322. For a comprehensive discussion, see A. DowNs, WHO ARE THE URBAN
POOR? (Committee for Economic Development, Supplementary Paper No. 26, 1968).
34 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (discussed in text and notes at notes 56-60
infra). Some lower federal courts appear to have held that governmental action that unintentionally imposes a burden on proportionately more members of racial minorities
than members of the racial majority is constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher,
F.2d - (Ist Cir. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971); Chance v. Board
of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on rehearing en banc, - F.2d (1972); Norvalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en bane sub. nom. Smuck v.
Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), enforced, 827 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). Although
the Court has not ruled on this question, it appears to have rejected a similar claim of
racial discrimination in Valtierra. See 402 U.S. at 141-42. See generally Lefcoe, The Public
Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIr. L. REv. 1884 (1971);
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HIv. L. REv. 3, 122-34 (1971); Comment, James v.
Valtierra: Housing Discrimination by Referendum?, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 115 (1971). In
Jefferson v. Hackney, 92 S. Ct. 1724 (1972), the Court held that a "naked statistical argument" was insufficient to prove that Texas had discriminated on the basis of race in the
allocation of welfare benefits. Id. at 1732.
85 See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Ritv. 767 (1969); Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 -ARv. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities
to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REv. 774 (1971); Note, The Equal Protection,Clause
and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
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various amenities they may offer, but more importantly because they
are often thought to provide access to better public schooling and
better job opportunities than lower-cost areas of residence. Exclusion
of the poor from better schooling or job opportunities is often said to
be similar to those governmental discriminations against indigents
that have recently been declared unconstitutional. 6 The Supreme
Court appears to have supported this view in McDonald v. Board of
Election Commissioners37 by saying that "a careful examination on
our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of
wealth or race . .

.

. two factors which would independently render

a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting
judicial scrutiny."'' 8 This dictum and a number of recent cases 39 seem
to suggest that governmental discrimination against a politically impotent minority implicitly defined by its relative poverty is constitutionally suspect or at least one of a number of factors prompting more
searching judicial review. 40
It is sufficient for the purposes of this comment to note that the Court
has invalidated relatively few governmental discriminations against the
poor. In every such case the payment of a fee was a statutory precondition to the effective enjoyment of what the Court has described as a
fundamental personal right. 41 In most cases the fundamental right denied to indigents was the constitutional right not to be imprisoned
without due process of law. Without the opportunity to obtain a trial
transcript or its equivalent, or without a lawyer on appeal, an indigent criminal defendant, in the Court's opinion, could not enjoy his
state-granted right to appeal a criminal conviction. 42 Although decided
on the basis of the equal protection clause, these cases are consistent
with earlier due process cases 43 protecting an indigent defendant's right
to a fair trial by providing him with trial counsel at government expense. Other cases favoring indigent criminal defendants are also consistent with a traditional due process analysis. 44 The Constitution's
protection of the individual from unjust imprisonment thus appears
36 See generally authorities cited note 35 supra.
37 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
38

Id. at 807 (dictum).

39 See generally cases cited notes 42-46, 50 infra.

40 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 nA (1938).
41 See generally Michelnan, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 88 HARV.L. Rav. 7 (1969).
42 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 US. 189 (1971); Douglas v. California, 872 US. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12 (1956).
43 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1982).
44 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Williams v.
Illinois, 899 U.S. 285, 259 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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to be at the heart of these cases. It is the fundamental right to personal
liberty and not the government's discrimination against the poor that
45
appears to be the primary rationale for the Court's decisions.
46
Boddie v. Connecticut appears to support this interpretation. In
Boddie the Court held that filing and service-of-process fees averaging
sixty dollars could not be required of an indigent as a precondition to
commencing an action for divorce. Justice Harlan's opinion rested on
the ground that due process was denied to those unable to pay the fees
only when the sole means for adjusting a "fundamental human relationship"47 was at stake. From this point of view, Boddie is plasibly
a continuation of a line of cases implicitly recognizing the fundamental
importance of the individual's right to make his own decisions with
respect to raising and educating a family.48 However this may be,
Boddie and its progeny in the lower courts49 are clearly based on the
constitutional right to fair judicial procedure and do not appear to
extend the Court's protection of the poor to the world outside the
courtroom.
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections0 is likewise consistent with a
fundamental rights analysis. In Harper the Court held that a state may
not require payment of a fee or a tax as a qualification for the right
to vote in state and local elections. Properly understood, Harper is not
a poverty case. The Court made clear that the poll tax was an unconstitutional burden on a fundamental right regardless of a potential voter's
ability to pay. In the words of Justice Douglas's opinion, "the right
to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be... burdened or conditioned '51 by a requirement, such as a poll tax, bearing "no relation to
voting qualifications.

' 52

45 See Argensinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).

46 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
47 Id. at 383.
48 The leading cases prior to Boddie are Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479
(1965); and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For a further continuation of this line,
see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972), and Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 473 (1970); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For
a detailed discussion of some possible implications of Dandridge, see Note, Legal Analysis
and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1856 (1971). See
generally Comment, Toward A National Policy on Population-Distribution, 47 WASH.
L. REv. 287 (1972).
49 O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); In re Naron, 334 F. Supp.
1150 (D. Ore. 1971); In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. United States v. Kras, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo.
1971).
50 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
51 Id. at 670.
52 Id. For an application of Harper to candidate filing fees, see Bullock v. Carter, 405
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As this discussion indicates, governmental discriminations against
the poor are not, by themselves, constitutionally suspect and therefore
are not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.53 Any legal argument addressed to the constitutionality of local land use regulations should
therefore focus its attention on constitutionally protected fundamental
rights.5 4 If local land use regulations can be shown to impose a significant burden on the exercise of one or more fundamental rights, the
Court is likely to shift the heavy burden of persuasion from the challenger of the regulation to the government agency that enforces it.
B.

Denial of the Right to Housing
Some commentators have suggested that the right to housing is a
fundamental constitutional right; others have suggested a two-level
theory bringing together the "quasi-suspect" classification based on
wealth with the "quasi-fundamental" right to housing or to "the
necessities of life" and have concluded that searching judicial review
would be justified on this basis.r 5
The Supreme Court, however, appears to have rejected these theories.
In the recent case of James v. Valtierra,6 the Court upheld the constitutionality of California's requirement that federally subsidized public
housing projects receive prior approval by majority vote in a local
referendum. Although the interest of the poor in decent housing was
at stake, the Court found that the injury to those unable to pay for
unsubsidized decent housing was outweighed by the state's justifications for requiring a referendum. 57 In Valtierra the Court applied the
U.S. 134 (1972). In Bullock the Court examined "in a realistic light the extent and nature
of [the filing fees'] impact on voters." Id. at 143. The Court held that "the very size of
the fees imposed under the Texas system gives it a patently exclusionary character." Id.
In the absence of reasonable alternative means of access to the primary ballot, the Court
held that excessive filing fees are an unconstitutional burden on the fundamental right to
vote. The Court added that "reasonable" candidate filing fees might not be unconstitutional. Id. at 149.
53 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 473 (1970); 25 VAND. L. REV. 180 (1972).
54 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1405 (1972) (Powell, J.). See also
id. at 1407-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's
Home Be a Castle?, 69 MicH. L. REv. 339 (1970).
55 See, e.g., Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHns-CIv. LIB. L. Rxv. 103 (1972). See generally authorities cited note 35 supra.
56 402 US. 137 (1971).
57 The local referendum furthered, in the Court's opinion, the legitimate state interest
of "democratic decision-making," which "ensures that all of the people of a community
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental
funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues." Id. at 143. Although the
governmental interest in democratic control of taxing and spending decisions is legitimate,
it is not sufficiently compelling to justify abridgements of fundamental personal rights.
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traditional "rational relationship" standard of judicial review. 8 Because the plaintiffs had not proved that the local referendum rejecting
a public housing project discriminated against them on the basis of
race or imposed a significant burden on the exercise of their fundamental personal rights, they were required to prove that the referendum requirement was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. 59 Valtierra
is a clear indication that the right to housing is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right.60 If land use regulations are unconstitutional, therefore, it can be only because they impinge on a recognized
fundamental right.

III.

THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE AND SETrLE IN ANY STATE IN THE UNION

Much of the current criticism of local land use regulations is based
on the belief that the natural and intended effect of some regulations
is to exclude certain classes of individuals, such as the poor, racial
minorities, or families with school-age children, from living in the more
desirable areas of a state. If some local land use regulations do in fact
prevent certain individuals from moving to and residing in some parts
of a state, these exclusionary regulations would be a significant burden
on an individual's freedom to migrate and settle within the state. If
this freedom is recognized and protected as a fundamental personal
right similar to the fundamental rights to vote or to freedom of speech,
it will be unnecessary to focus, as do the equal protection arguments
discussed in previous sections, on the personal or class characteristics
See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
text and notes at notes 41-54 supra, 61-83, 127-29 infra.
58 See generally Lefcoe, supra note 34; Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, supra note 35.
59 It was argued on appeal that the local referendum requirement "unconstitutionally
burdens the basic freedom of all persons to travel and migrate throughout the nation."
Brief for National Urban Coalition et al. as Amid Curiae at 46. The Court does not mention this argument and appears to have rejected it. However this may be, Valtierra might
be distinguished as a case in which the actual plaintiffs had not been excluded from
settling in San Jose and had not proved that the local referendum's rejection of public
housing significantly burdened their right to do so. The plaintiffs claimed only that they
were injured by the denial of "decent, safe, and adequate housing within the City of San
Jose." Appendix at 11. Since public housing may be viewed as a public benefit facilitating
the exercise of the right to migrate and settle and since that benefit was not denied only
to persons who had exercised that right, the denial of public housing was plausibly not a
burden in the constitutional sense on the right to migrate and settle. For further discussion of this point, see text and notes at notes 87-89, 121 infra. See also note 60 infra.
60 In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court held that there was no "constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality ....
Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing [is a] legislative not [a] judicial function."
Id. at 74.
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of the individuals excluded, since a prima facie showing of a significant
burden on the exercise of a fundamental right requires the government
to justify the regulation imposing the burden with more than a rational
relation to a legitimate governmental interest.,'
Freedom to migrate to and settle in any state in the Union is constitutionally protected by the fundamental right to travel.6 2 Although
the Constitution contains no provision explicitly mentioning this right,
the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases beginning with Crandallv.
Nevada, 3 has protected the freedom of United States citizens to travel
from one state to another. The Court has often quoted approvingly
Chief Justice Taney's dissent in the Passenger Cases6 4: "For all the
great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are
one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the
United States; and, as members of the same community, must have
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States." 65 In the recent case of Dunn v.
6 the Court again described the" 'freedom to travel throughBlumstein,1
out the United States

. .

. as a basic right under the Constitution.' -67

More significantly, the Court suggested that the freedom to migrate to
68
and settle in any state in the Union is a "fundamental personal right"
equal in constitutional stature to the fundamental right to vote. In
Dunn the Court placed "a heavy burden of justification . . . on the

State"6 9 and held that any statute directly impinging on the "'uncondi61 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Harman v. Forssenius,

280 U.S. 528 (1965).
62 The Court has used the word "travel" to mean both mere movement, see, e.g., United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada, 78 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), and
migration with the intent to reside indefinitely, see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 294 U.S. 618 (1969). To avoid ambiguity this comment refers
to the second sense of the right to "travel" as the right to migrate and settle. For a discussion of the Court's use of "travel" to include migration with the intent to settle, see
text and notes at notes 66-83 infra. See also notes 86, 121 infra.
63 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). Other cases protecting the right to travel from state to
state are Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); and Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971). For a discussion of a recent case similar to Crandall, see text and notes at
notes 87-89 infra.
64 48 U.S. (7How.) 283 (1849).
65 Id. at 492 (quoted approvingly in, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
48-49 (1867); United States v. Guest, 388 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); and Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969)).
66 92 S.Ct. 995 (1972).
67 Id. at 1001.
68 Id.
69 Id. at

1008.
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tional personal right' "70 to travel would be "closely scrutinized." 71
Dunn is a logical successor to a line of cases recognizing that the right
to travel from state to state includes a right to migrate to and settle
in any state in the Union.7 2 Two key earlier cases are Edwards v.
7 3 and Shapiro
California
v. Thompson. 4
Edwards involved a statute imposing a criminal penalty for bringing
an indigent nonresident into the state. California had enacted the challenged law as part of its effort to stem the huge influx of poor migrants
from the "dust bowl" states of the Southwest. The additional burden
that these indigent new residents placed on California was severely
aggravated by the great depression of the 1930s. The Court held,
however, that the nature of the union established by the Constitution
did not permit any one state to "isolate itself from the difficulties
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons
and property across its borders." 75 Although members of the Court
disagreed about the source of constitutional protection for the right,7 6
70 Id. (emphasis omitted).
71 Id.

72 Cases implicitly recognizing and protecting the right to migrate and settle include
Truax v. Raich, 289 U.S. 33 (1915); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); and Graham
v. Richardson, 403 US. 365 (1971). Cases explicitly recognizing and protecting the right
include Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 237,
285 (1970) (concurring opinions); and Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972). But cf.
New York v. O'Neill, 359 US. 1 (1959); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
73 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
74 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
75 314 U.S. at 173.
76 In Edwards the majority opinion relied on the fact that California's criminal penalties
were a burden on commerce among the states and therefore prohibited by the Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause. In a concurring opinion, Justices Douglas, Black,
and Murphy thought it more appropriate to base constitutional protection of "the right to
move freely from State to State" on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 179. Justice Jackson also preferred the privileges and immunities rationale. His concurring opinion stated that "the migrations of a human being... do not fit
easily into my notions as to what is commerce. To hold that the measure of his rights is the
commerce clause is likely to result eventually in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights." Id. at 182. Justice Jackson argued that Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915) (where the Court declared that an alien lawfully admitted to the United States
had the constitutionally protected privilege "of entering and abiding in any State in the
Union," id. at 39), was sufficient authority "to hold that federal citizenship implies rights to
enter and abide in any state of the Union at least equal to those possessed by aliens .... " 314
U.S. at 184. Moreover, he referred to the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment
and American history as additional authorities for a constitutional privilege "to enter any
state of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent
residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof." Id. at 183. For a detailed
discussion of possible constitutional sources of the right to travel, see Z. CnAM, THREE
Hua.N RIHrs IN THE CONSTITUTION oF 1787, at 162 et seq. (1956); Vestal, Freedom of
Movement, 41 IowA L. REv. 6 (1955); Note, Interstate Migration and Personal Liberty, 40
COLum. L. REv. 1032 (1940); Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HAsv. L. REv.
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Edwards clearly holds that a state may not impose a penalty or an
unjustified restriction only on the migration of nonresidents into the
77
state.
In Shapiro v. Thompson78 the right to migrate and settle was clearly
in question. Several states and the District of Columbia required that
persons reside within the state or the District for one year before becoming eligible for federally assisted state or District welfare payments.
The Court held that the one-year waiting period was unconstitutional
as an unreasonable burden on the exercise of the constitutional right
to travel.7 9 Justice Brennan's opinion recognized that a one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits clearly injured an indigent
person "who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a
new life."8 0
Although the persons disadvantaged by the regulations in Edwards
and Shapiro were indigents, it is significant to note that it is the right
to migrate and settle and not the economic status of the person asserting
the right that was the decisive factor for the Court. Previous right-totravel cases, such as Crandall,did not rely on the economic status of
the persons affected by the challenged regulations. Indeed, the tax
imposed by Nevada on all persons leaving the state by common carrier
was only one dollar.
In the recent case of Dunn v. Blumstein,8 1 the right to migrate and
settle was impermissibly burdened by Tennessee's denial to new resi1031 (1940); Comment, State Control of Interstate Migration of Indigents, 40 MICI. L.
REV. 711 (1942); authorities cited note 115 infra.
77 California's purpose was to prevent migration to and settlement in the state. The
burdens on California's economy and government were not caused by travelers passing
through the state, but by additional residents of the state. For a general discussion of the
political and economic background of the case, see SFELEr Cozar. oF THE HOUSE OF RPRESENTATIVES INVESTIGATING NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION, 77Tn CONG., Isr SEss., ANALYSIS OF
MATERIAL (Comm. Print 1941) (filed as a supplement to the brief of John H. Tolan,
Amicus Curiae, in Edwards). See also authorities cited note 76 supra.
78 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
79 The District of Columbia is governed by Congress, to which the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause does not apply. The Court held that the due process clause
of the fifth amendment prevented Congress from discriminating against new residents of
the district. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren (joined by Justice Black)
interpreted the Court's decision as holding that "residence requirements constitute 'an
arbitrary deprivation' of liberty." Id. at 652. The dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan
concluded "that the right to travel interstate is a 'fundamental' right which, for present
purposes, should be regarded as having its source in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 671. Thus, the Court appears to have held that the right to travel
from state to state or from states to the District is a fundamental liberty. For the possible
implications of this view, see text and notes at notes 112-19 infra.
80 Id. at 629.
81 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972).
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dents of the State of the right to vote for United States Senators and
Representatives and various state and local officers by means of oneyear-in-the-state and three-month-in-the-county residency requirements.8 2 Dunn is a significant example of the Court's continuing protection of the right to migrate and settle. Although durational residency
requirements for voting were also held unconstitutional as an unjustified denial of the right to vote, the Court made clear that the burden
imposed on the right to migrate and settle was a sufficient basis for its
decision. In discussing this additional, and apparently unnecessary,
ground, the Court appears to have gone out of its way to emphasize
"that the freedom to travel includes the 'freedom to enter and abide
in any State in the Union.' "83
Despite the Supreme Court's holdings in Edwards, Shapiro, and
Dunn, the extent to which the right to migrate and settle in any state
in the Union is a constitutional basis for challenging local land use
regulations is an open question. In Edwards and Shapiro the right to
travel was abridged by regulations that had the effect of equally
penalizing any new resident of the state no matter where he chose to
reside within the state. It may therefore be argued that regulations
imposing a local but not a statewide burden might be constitutional
since migration and settlement in other parts of the state would not be
penalized. 4 A more promising distinction is that in Edwards and
Shapiro the challenged regulations in fact discriminated only against
interstate migrants.8 5 If state or local regulations equally restricted the
82 The actual plaintiff in Dunn was a migrant from another state. Although the plaintiff sued as a representative of that class of bona fide residents of Tennessee who had not
resided in the state for twelve months or in the county for three months, he himself did
not necessarily represent the class of intrastate migrants.
83 Id. at 1001 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970) (concurring opinion)).
84 See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a one-year state residency requirement for lower tuition fees at the state university. But cf. authorities cited notes
90-92 infra. It might be possible to view Starns as a case that involves restrictions only
on residence near the University. However interpreted, Starns may be reversed if a similar
case receives a full hearing on the merits. Compare Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 955
(1972), with Dreudling v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 U.S. 125
(1965).
85 In Edwards only the immigration of nonresidents of California was penalized.
Shapiro also involved actual discrimination only against interstate migrants. From a purely
formal point of view, of course, durational residency requirements apply to both migrants
and nonnigrants; both must reside in the state or locality for the required period of time.
By its very nature, a state or local durational residency requirement for a public benefit
imposes a burden on all new residents. But not all new residents are migrants; some are
born in the state or locality. In Shapiro, however, the states and the District had discriminated against recent interstate migrants because newborn children of old state

1972]

Right to Travel and Land Use Regulations

freedom of both interstate and intrastate migrants to migrate and settle,
they might be constitutional.8 6
Dunn does not clearly resolve these questions for three reasons. First,
although the Court invalidated Tennessee's statewide voting qualification of three months residency in the county, this part of the Court's
holding may have been grounded solely on the fundamental right to
vote rather than on the right to migrate and settle. Second, Tennessee
did not in fact treat all migrants equally. Intercounty migrants otherwise eligible to vote were permitted to vote in the county of their
former residence if they had not resided for three months in their new
county; intracounty migrants were not penalized at all. Interstate migrants suffered most from the county residency requirement. Third,
the three-month county residency requirement applied uniformly
throughout the state and was therefore not a purely local burden.
From the point of view of an interstate migrant, Tennessee significantly
burdened his settlement everywhere in the state.
In another recent right-to-travel case, Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines,87 the Court again left these
questions undecided. In Evansville the court held that a local airport
authority's use and service charge of one dollar for each passenger
boarding any commercial aircraft was not forbidden by the commerce
clause, the equal protection clause, or the constitutionally protected
right to travel. To reach this result, the Court distinguished Crandall
v. Nevada88 on the ground that Nevada had discriminated against interstate travel by imposing a one dollar tax only on those leaving the state,
while the airport authority taxed both persons leaving the state and
those traveling within it. The Court, however, also distinguished Crandall by viewing the airport tax as a reasonable approximation of the
cost of conferring a benefit on the traveler, the use of a publicly built
and operated airport. For this reason, it held that the fee charged was
"not a burden in the constitutional sense" and that therefore "[t]he
principle that burdens on the right to travel are constitutional only if
residents received welfare benefits, while newborn children of new state residents did not.
See 394 U.S. at 622 n.1, 624 n.3, 626 n.5. See also note 86 infra.
88 The Court's opinion in Dunn suggests that some differences between the states (e.g.,

different age requirements for drivers' licenses) do not significantly burden the right to
migrate and settle if the requirements apply equally to migrants and nonmigrants. 92 S.
Ct. at 1003 n.12; see note 85 supra. For a discussion of this limitation on the application
of the right to migrate and settle to local land use regulations, see text and notes at notes
104-111, 120-21 infra.
87 92 S.Ct. 1349 (1972).

88 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:612

shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state interest has no
application in this context."'8 9 Since the Court found that no burden
had been imposed on the fundamental right to travel, the case does not
shed light on whether a state or local government is permitted to impose a burden on the right to migrate and settle if it treats interstate
and intrastate migrants equally.
Although the position of the Court on these questions remains ambiguous, lower federal courts have held that regulations imposing significant burdens on all interstate and most intrastate migrants are
unconsitutional. 90 In Cole v. Housing Authority,91 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the local requirement of two years
residency in the city of Newport, Rhode Island was an unconstitutional
prerequisite for access to a federally assisted public housing project.
Although one of the plaintiffs had migrated to Newport from another
state and another plaintiff had migrated from a community within
Rhode Island, the court's opinion assumed sub silentio that both migrations were protected by the right to travel enunciated in Shapiro.
The same result was reached in the nearly identical case of King v.
New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority,2 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "the use of the term 'interstate travel' in Shapiro was [nothing] more than a reflection of the
statewide enactments involved in that case."9 3 Since the Shapiro opinion "relied on 'our constitutional concepts of personal liberty' ,9 as a
source of the right to travel, the court thought it would be "meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental
precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state." 95
89 92 S. Ct. at 1349.
90 Demiragh v. DeVos, 337 F. Supp. 483 (D. Conn. 197-) (health regulation requiring
one-year residency in the city unconstitutional as a precondition for welfare benefits);
Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971) (three-judge court) (one-year residency in the county as a precondition for state-provided nonemergency medical care for
the indigent unconstitutional). But see Reitz v. Town of Vanden Broek, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 191
N.W.2d 913 (1971), appeal dismissed, 92 S. Ct. 1608 (1972). In Reitz the court upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute that imposed a one year in the locality residency requirement for general relief benefits. The case is similar to Pease v. Hansen, 157 Mont. 99, 483
P.2d 720, rev'd per curiam, 404 U.S. 70 (1971), except that Pease involved a one-year-in-thestate requirement for county welfare benefits, and Reitz involved a one-year-in-the-locality
requirement. Although the Court dismissed the .Reitz appeal for want of a substantial
federal question, Justice Stewart would have dismissed the appeal as moot. 92 S. Ct. at 1608.
91 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
92 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
93 Id. at 648.
94 Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)).
95 Id.
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IV.

Two VIEws OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Although Cole and King extend judicial protection of the right to
migrate and settle so as to reach purely local regulations that impose
burdens on all interstate and most intrastate migrants, it is open to
question whether the right would invalidate local land use regulations.
The answer may depend on a determination of the constitutional
source of the right to migrate and settle. The right may be constitutionally protected either because of "the nature of our Federal Union," 96
in which case most land use regulations that applied equally to interstate and intrastate migrants would appear to be constitutional, or
because the right is "a fundamental precept of personal liberty," 97 in
which case most such regulations would appear to be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny when they impose burdens on the exercise of the fundamental right to migrate and settle.
A.

The Nature of the Union
In numerous cases, including Edwards, Shapiro, Dunn, and Evansville,9 8 the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution on the
basis of underlying presuppositions about the nature of the Union.
It is reasonable to say that the Constitution established neither a mere
customs and trading union of independent states nor a confederation
designed only for common defense against external enemies, but rather
one nation with a general government having, in certain cases, authority
to rule throughout the country.99
The limits of Congress's legislative power with respect to the states
are the explicit prohibitions of the Constitution and the traditional
pattern of allocation of responsibilities between the national and state
governments. It should be emphasized that in recent times the latter
limits have usually changed when Congress chose to change them. 100
96 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969); see text and notes at notes 98-111
infra.
97 King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1971); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); note 79 supra; text and notes at notes
112-19 infra.
98 For a discussion of these cases, see text and notes at notes 66-89 supra.
99 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). For a comprehensive
discussion, see A NATION OF STATES, EssAYs ON THE AMzERICAN FEDrAL SYsrE (R. Goldwin

ed. 1963).
100 The modern development of congressional power is reflected in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); FPC v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972); and cases cited note 103 infra. But cf. Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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The political power of the states and their local governments is protected not so much by the explicit prohibitions of the Constitution as
by the political representation the states have in Congress. 0 1 If Congress
enacts a national land use statute limiting the power of the states or
their local governments to regulate the uses of land within their jurisdictions, 1 2 the Court would probably find such legislation constitutionally authorized by the commerce clause or section five of the four03
teenth amendment.
In the absence of congressional legislation, the Court is more cautious, traditionally deferring, as has been discussed above, to most
economic and social legislation by the states and their local governments. 0 4 Nevertheless, the Court will hold state and local regulations
unconstitutional if they are repugnant to the nature of the Union
established by the Constitution. State and local governments may not
unduly restrict the free flow of persons and goods throughout the
Union and may not discriminate against persons and goods from sister
states and from abroad. 10 5 The Court thus prevents the "Balkanization"
of the Union into hostile states and localities, each attempting to
"feather its own nest" at the expense of the others.
In light of this traditional doctrine, the Court is not likely to invalidate many local land use regulations if the primary constitutional
source of the right to migrate and settle is the nature of the Union.
Under this view the Court has generally found state and local regula• 101 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). See generally A NATION OF STATES,
ESSAYS ON THE AMRICAN FrEERA SYSTEM, supra note 99; Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism-The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, in PRINCIPLES, PoLITIcS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49 (1961).
102 The proposed National Land Use Policy Act of 1971, S. 992, H.R. 4332, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), requires state regulation of certain local land uses, but does not establish
detailed national standards.
103 Shapiro holds that Congress may not impose unjustified burdens on the fundamental
right to travel and migrate from state to state and to and from the District of Columbia.
On the other hand, other decisions by the Court clearly permit Congress to extend the
legal protection of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969); United States v. Guest, 883 US. 745 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 US. 241 (1964).
104 See text and notes at notes 2-19 supra.
105 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 US. 365 (1971); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 US. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951); Hood 9- Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 885
(1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 US. 33 (1915);
Ward v. Maryland, 79 US. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 US. (6 Wall.) 35
(1867); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824).
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tions to be unconstitutional (1) when they raise the costs of carrying
on commerce among the states and the burden imposed is not justified
or (2) when they discriminate primarily against out-of-state persons
or goods. 10 6 The first rule usually applies only in commercial contexts
and may at best serve to invalidate only a few local land use regulations.' 0 7 The second rule appears to exempt most local land use regulations from invalidation since they usually affect interstate and intrastate
migration equally.
A notable application of the first rule to a local ordinance that discriminated against both interstate and intrastate commerce is Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison.0 8 The challenged ordinance required all
pasteurized milk sold in Madison, Wisconsin to be processed and
bottled at plants approved by the Madison Public Health Department.
In the interest of "convenient, economical and efficient plant inspection,"19 Madison required all pasteurization plants to be within a five-

mile radius of the center of the city. Since Dean Milk, an Illinois milk
company, did not have a pasteurization plant within the five-mile limit,
it could not sell its pasteurized milk in Madison. The Court, finding
that reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives were available to accomplish the city's public health interest, held that the ordinance imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
Applied broadly, the Dean Milk standard might invalidate many local
land use regulations. Particularly vulnerable would be localities whose
regulations significantly raised the costs of settlement without sufficient
justification. Such an application of Dean Milk, however, seems unlikely. 110 Even if such a standard were applied to local land use regulations, the Court might find the burdens imposed in most cases to be
justified. If the source of the right to migrate and settle is the nature of
the Union, local regulations whose effect on interstate migration and
settlement appears to be fairly small might be justified by the public
interest in local government."'
106 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See generally Stern, The
Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process,4 VAND. L. REv. 446 (1951).
107 But see Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1867). Local building codes that significantly raise the costs of using factorybuilt housing, especially when the factory is in another state, might be unconstitutional
as unjustified burdens on commerce among the states. Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 US. 349 (1951). But cf. Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 US. 440 (1960).
108 340 US. 49 (1951).
109 Id. at 352.
110 Cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
11 See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 US. 137 (1971); text
and notes at notes 123-24.
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B.

Fundamental Personal Liberty
In Gitlow v. New York 112 the Supreme Court began to recognize
certain "fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'" as part of the
liberty that is "protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment from impairment by the States."" 3 The right to travel
from state to state has been explicitly designated by the Court as a
fundamental personal right, and in Shapiro and Dunn the right to
migrate and settle was added to that select group of rights regarded
by the Court as fundamental to American liberty. 14
Such a result is sensible, especially insofar as the very notion of
liberty for Americans and their English ancestors included the right
to exercise the natural power of locomotion free from unjustified governmental restraints. 1 5 In addition to freedom of movement, Americans have enjoyed and valued the liberty of living anywhere within
the United States. Even today, long after the passing of the frontier
and massive European immigration, nearly twenty percent of the nation's population changes its place of residence each year." 6 Freedom
"to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life""17 may be
viewed as part of the liberty that distinguishes American life from the
more stratified and less mobile societies of the "old world."
If the freedom to migrate and settle is as fundamental to American
liberty as freedom of speech, unjustified local restrictions on such a
fundamental liberty would be unconstitutional even if they applied
equally to both interstate and intrastate migrants and did not have a
significant adverse impact on interstate commerce or travel. Funda112 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
113 Id. at 666; cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
114 See text and notes at notes 61-83 supra.
115 See 1 W. BLAcKsroNE, COMMENTArIES *134: "Next to personal security, the law of
England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal
liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person
to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law." See generally Z. CHAmE., supra note 76; Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLum. L. R v. 47 (1956); Vestel, Freedom of Movement,
supra note 76; Note, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 CoLum. L.
REv. 134 (1970); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 989 (1969); Comment, The Right to Travel and its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, supra note 4; Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protection and
Application Under the Constitution,supra note 4; authorities cited note 76 supra.
116 U.S. BuRAu oF TnE CENsus, supra note 85, at 34. Between March, 1969 and March,
1970, 18.4 percent of the population moved to another residence; 11.7 percent moved
within the county of their former residence; 3.1 percent moved to another county within
the state of their former residence, and 3.6 percent moved to another state. Id. See generally H. SnRyocK, PoPurL.ON MoBxmTY WITmN THE UNTED STATES (1964).
17 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 629 (1969).

1972]

Right to Travel and Land Use Regulations

mental liberties are protected by the Constitution wherever they may
be abridged."18
In Shapiro the Court's invalidation of the District of Columbia's
durational residency requirement seems to indicate that the right to
migrate to and settle in any state in the Union is a fundamental personal liberty since under the traditional view congressional legislation
can be held unconstitutional only on such a basis and not on the basis
9
of the nature of the Union."
It is altogether possible for the Court to hold explicitly that the
right to travel is based primarily on the constitution's protection of
personal liberty rather than the nature of the Union established by
the Constitution. The guarantee of liberty contained in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments is large enough for an interpretation protecting the freedom to migrate and settle anywhere within the United
States. Both judicial precedent and a long-standing American tradition
of individual liberty would support the Court should it choose to adopt
this view.
V.

SIGNIFICANT BURDENS, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES

As has been discussed above, the key to a successful challenge of the
constitutionality of local land use regulations is a showing that they
impose significant burdens on a person's fundamental right to migrate
and settle. If the Supreme Court chooses to adopt the nature of the
Union as the constitutional source of the right, a successful challenge
is likely to require prima facie evidence that the regulations discriminate against or impose significantly higher costs on interstate migration
or commerce. Although such a showing would appear to be difficult, it
might be possible for at least some land use regulations. 120 If, on the
other hand, the Court chooses to adopt the fundamental personal liberty
rationale, a prima facie case of a burden on the right to migrate and
settle might well be established if local regulations imposed higher costs
12
on settlement in the locality.
118 See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).

119 See 894 U.S. at 645 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); id. at 655 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); note 79 supra.
120 See note 107 supra. National associations of home builders or building suppliers
and large firms with national interests may well have sufficient financial incentives to
gather and present the relevant information to a court.
121 But cf. text and note at note 111 supra. The right to migrate and settle should not
be confused with the right to settle. A constitutional right to travel, the origin of the
right to migrate and settle, is infringed by significant burdens on migrants. Since most land
use regulations raise housing costs for all residents, migrants and nonmigrants alike, they
indirectly impinge on the right to migrate and settle, but directly impinge on the right to
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Under the latter view, once a prima facie case is established, the
state or local government will be required to justify the burden
imposed by its regulations by proving that they are "'necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest' ,122 or that the degree of
restriction is outweighed by "countervailing State interests of overriding importance."' 23 Although these different wordings of the constitutional test may have different implications, 24 whatever verbal formula
the Court applies is likely to demand far better justification for local
settle. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 n.12 (1972). The right to settle differs from
the right to decent housing rejected in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), and James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See notes 59, 86 supra. Even if the right to migrate and
settle is infringed by local regulations imposing significantly higher costs on the right to
settle, it is open to question whether a potential migrant has sufficient standing to maintain such a claim. In Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 335 F. Supp. 899 (E.D.
Mo. 1971), the court held that the corporate plaintiffs did not have standing to raise the
claim "that the purpose and effect of the zoning ordinance is to exclude persons of moderate and lower income, including Negroes, from the City of Black Jack." Id. at 902.
If a potential migrant is without standing to maintain such a claim, it is arguable that the
owner of the property may assert the claim on behalf of those allegedly excluded by the
regulation. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925); Truax v. Raich,

239 U.S. 33 (1915).
122 Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 955, 1003 (1972) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969); emphasis on "necessary" added in Dunn).
123 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). Compare Justice Harlan's dissent
in Shapiro: "The core inquiry is 'the extent of the governmental restriction imposed' and
the 'extent of the necessity for the restriction."' 394 U.S. at 650 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk,
381 US. 1, 14 (1965)). Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), suggests that some local land
use regulations might be justified under either formulation. Abate; Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 US. 124 (1971); and Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), are additional evidence that
the "necessary to a compelling governmental interest" test does "not have the precision of
mathematical formulas . . .

,"

but rather "emphasize[s] a matter of degree: that a heavy

burden of justification is on the State, and that the statute will be closely scrutinized in
light of its asserted purposes." Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972); see note 124
infra.
1241 The differences appear to be largely verbal. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401

U.S. 371 (1971) (Harlan, J.), with id. at 383, 386 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., concurring). For
a discussion of "substantive equal protection" and its similarity to "substantive due
process," see Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the
"Natural Law-Due Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969); Karst & Horowitz,
Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. Rr v. 39;

Michelman, supra note 41. The different judicial positions that sometimes appear to be
the result of which verbal formula is applied, see, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), are more likely different judicial evaluations of the extent of the burden imposed
and the sufficiency of the explanation offered for the burden. Cf. text and notes at notes
43-61 supra. What saves such judicial "balancing" from pure subjectivism is the fundamental rights doctrine inherent in the American tradition and enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. For a philosophic discussion, see L. Sr.Auss,
NATURAL RIGHT AND HSrORY

(1953).
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land use regulations burdening the right to migrate and settle than
that held sufficient in Euclid. Even if a state's health or safety interest
is adjudged to be compelling or overriding, the means employed to protect that interest will also be required to be necessary, not merely reasonable or convenient. Thus, although adequate sewage disposal is a
compelling governmental interest, a local community probably could
not justify large-lot requirements as a necessary means to insure adequate septic tank capability. Performance standards, such as bacteria
counts, may provide an adequate but less onerous alternative means.
If so, large-lot requirements that significantly burden the right to
migrate and settle would be unconstitutional. 125 In judging whether the
burden imposed by any particular regulation is justified, the Court
would be required to make difficult decisions about the actual effect of
different economic regulations and the availability of practical alternatives. Such decisions are similar to those once made by the Court in
"substantive due process" cases.

26

A second justification for local land use regulations is the desire,
through exclusion of additional residents, to keep the rate of taxation
low and the level of governmental services relatively high. In Edwards,
Shapiro, and Bullock v. Carter,127 however, the Court rejected such
justifications. Although the state or local government's interest in preserving a lower rate of taxation or a higher level of governmental
services is legitimate, it is, in the Court's view, an insufficient reason
to burden the exercise of the constitutional right to migrate and settle.
In addition, if the School FinancingCases12

8

are upheld by the Court

(which appears to be unlikely'29 ), one of the primary reasons for local
exclusiveness is likely to lose much of its persuasive power.
See Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 867 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962).
See notes 16-17, 123-24 supra. See also Note, Legitimate Use Exclusions Through
Zoning: Applying a Balancing Test, 57 CoaRNm L. Rxv. 461 (1972).
125
126

92 S. Ct. 849 (1972); see note 52 supra.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 8d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Rodriguez
v San Antonio Independent School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris.
noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 384 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Sweetwater
127
128

County Planning Comm'n v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
129 Serrano apparently rests on an independent state ground adequate to support the
judgment of the California Supreme Court. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11; see Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965),
on remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 821, 43 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1965). If the argument that
classifications based on wealth are not constitutionally suspect is correct, see text and notes
at notes 33-54 supra, then to uphold the other cases, the Court would be required to hold
that the right to education is a constitutionally protected fundamental right, see text
and notes at notes 55-61 supra. Although such a decision might be desirable, the right to
education, unlike the right to travel, has very little support in previous cases. The Court's
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A third justification for local land use regulations is the need for a
comprehensive community development plan. Even if such a plan is
a compelling state interest, however, it is clear that most land use regulations are not applied in such a way that a community could demonstrate
their necessary relation to a comprehensive plan. Most regulations
appear to follow the vagaries of private and public demand rather than
the principles of a public planner.13 0
Fourth and fifth justifications for local land use regulations are the
widespread desires for neighborhood homogeneity and preservation of
property values. It is doubtful, however, that the Court would classify
these interests as "compelling."'' 31 In any event, sufficient less onerous
means are available to both state and local governments to encourage
the attainment of these ends. As previously mentioned, performance
32
standards or their equivalents may be used to achieve certain ends.
To the extent that individuals desire additional protection, private
agreements are likely to secure and protect private interests. The experience of Houston, Texas, a major city lacking most traditional land
use regulations, suggests that private agreements provide an equal,
decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 847 U.S. 483 (1954), clearly rested on a racial discrimination rationale. The fact that the particular injury to the plaintiffs was the denial
of equal educational opportunities appears to have little constitutional significance absent
racial discrimination. Later cases involving racial discrimination in other contexts were
often per curiam decisions citing Brown. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf courses). But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1544 (1972) (White, J., concurring). There is evidence that
present differences in per capita pupil expenditures do not have a significant effect
on either educational opportunities or achievement. See generally J. COLEMAN et al.,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); F. MosrELLER & D. MOYNI-AN, ON EQUALrrY
OF EDUCATONAL OPrORTUNITY (1972). Consequently, there appears to be little practical
reason for concluding that the typical property tax system imposes a significant burden on
the right to education, even assuming that it might be a constitutionally protected fundamental right. See generally Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A
CriticalAnalysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. R1v. 504 (1972).

130 See Dunham, Book Review, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav. 673 (1972); authorities cited note 133
infra. For a critical discussion, see Sullivan, Regional Planning and Economic Dispersal
Programs in Great Britain: The Elusive Goal of "Balanced Growth," 23 STAN. L. Rav. 903

(1971).
131 For an argument that such interests are of considerable public importance, see
Mansfield, DisguisedLiberalism, 18 PUB. Porucy 605, 611-20 (1970). In some states preservation of property values justifies aesthetic controls. E.g., State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955); cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954).
132 See, e.g., CHIcAGo, ILL., MuNIci'Ar CODE ch. 17, art. IV (1971); Statute, A Model
Ordinance to Control Noise Through Building Code Perlormance Standards, 9 HARv. J.

Iais.

66 (1971).
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and perhaps a higher, level of protection for both private and public
interests. 133
If the Court defines and protects the right to migrate and settle as a
fundamental liberty, few local land use regulations are likely to survive
in their present form. Performance and other more discriminating
standards are likely to replace the present system of use districts, building and housing codes, and subdivision controls. Private agreements,
such as covenants running with the land or neighborhood associations,
are likely to assume many of the tasks now performed by governmental
regulation. Given the magnitude of some of these changes, judicial
decrees in local land use regulation cases should probably allow governments and private parties sufficient time to adjust to different and
constitutional forms of protection of their legitimate interests. Blanket
decrees invalidating all local land use regulations should be avoided;
simple prudence would seem to require judicial moderation in such a
sweeping task.
CONCLUSION

Commentators have described local land use regulations as governmental barriers serving to fence Americans out of many parts of their
own country. In light of this criticism, serious constitutional challenges
133 See Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAw & ECON. 71 (1970); Note, Land Use
Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S.

CAL. L. Rnv. 335 (1972). The Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), suggests that court enforcement of private land use agreements would be state action and
therefore subject to the same judicial scrutiny as present governmental regulations. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), on the other
hand, suggests that the judicial test is whether the private property is "dearly the functional equivalent" of a "community business block." Id. at 318-19. Perhaps the important
question is whether racial discrimination or first amendment rights are at issue. After
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), Shelley is no longer needed for racial discrimination cases. If Mr.
Siegan is correct, private regulations usually result in less severe burdens than public
regulations. If so, more private than public regulations are likely to pass the constitutional
test, assuming that it applies. Moreover, Logan Valley suggests that the right of privacy
may be, in some cases, sufficient to justify reasonable private regulations of private property. The right to privacy adds weight to the argument for private, as opposed to public,
regulation of private property. Public regulations are also, generally speaking and in the
absence of a private monopoly, less responsive to changes in private preferences than are
private regulations. Public regulations appear to impose higher costs by causing needless
delay in planning and building. See Siegan, supra. Although a system of predominantly
private regulations is not likely to enable all of the poor to move into all of the better
neighborhoods, it may very well tend to lower overall costs and to facilitate migration
and settlement. Such a result, although not likely to satisfy more radical critics, is likely
to be a desirable one, not only for the poor, but more importantly, for the nation as a
whole.
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to such regulations are inevitable. This comment has presented the
case for a challenge based on the fundamental right to migrate and
settle. It is perhaps to this constitutional right that the barriers will
prove the most vulnerable.
Richard Fielding

